Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice

Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice

Nathan Nobis

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 36, Issue 3, June 2011, Pages 261–273, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhr015

Published:

19 May 2011

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Abstract

In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal, “Defending Abortion Philosophically”(2006), Francis Beckwith argues that fetuses are, from conception, prima facie wrong to kill. His arguments are based on what he calls a “metaphysics of the human person” known as “The Substance View.” I argue that Beckwith’s metaphysics does not support his abortion ethic: Moral, not metaphysical, claims that are part of this Substance View are the foundation of the argument, and Beckwith inadequately defends these moral claims. Thus, Beckwith’s arguments do not provide strong support for what he calls the “pro-life” view of abortion.

Available here.

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• Pro-life virtues and vices? Pro-choice virtues and vices? On sex/gender and arguments

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• "When does life begin?' and 'Are fetuses human?': Two bad questions to ask about abortion"