Comments on comments
NN: by request, I commented on these comments on my comments; I encourage reading the backstory and their comments and full before reading these in-text comments on the comments:
The Worldview Bulletin Newsletter
[Note: Dr. Parrish ran into some technical difficulties trying to post the response below from his account, so I’m posting it for him.]
Nathan Nobis disagrees with our critique of abortion. We shall respond to the main points he makes.
He starts out by making a red herring argument, focusing on the definition of “child”, or “children.”
Are unborn babies children? Nobis rejects this. He argues that children are young people, and that since is it generally bad to kill people, this defines abortion as being wrong. He claims that this then “assumes” that abortion is wrong. He’s not far from the truth on his conclusion. However, the word child has more than one meaning.
NN: yes, and what’s needed is the or a meaning that entails “wrong to kill,” which would be “young person.” And, no, one cannot merely assert that, say, an embryo is a young person; one would need a good argument that an embryo is a young person.
A pregnant woman may say that “she is with child.” A person whose children are adults may say that their children have grown and flown. Women who deliver babies go through “childbirth.” The point is, from a very real perspective, the unborn are, indeed, our children, whatever else we may think of the matter. Ask any woman who has suffered a loss of her “child” by miscarriage. In one sense of the word, children are defined by a relationship. Their DNA is a combination of the parents’ genes. People often call embryos or fetuses unborn babies. By pointing out the obvious fact that the unborn are our children, we are merely [NN!] highlighting that the unborn are the first stages in the existence of what will, under normal circumstance, be a complete human life. They come into existence because of us.
NN: yes, but this is obvious and nobody denies this: this is not the issue here. This does not show that, say, embryos are young people who are wrong to kill.
So, by calling the unborn children “babies,” etc., we are not “begging the question” (assuming something that needs to be proven); we are merely using the terms in ways that many people do.
Similarly, the word “person” can be used in different ways. It can mean a human being that is born and has the ability to reason (to an extent), but it can also be used in the sense that it is a human being—a being that will, under normal circumstances, achieve adulthood and rationality. The first usage may be the primary one, but people sometimes say that human beings are persons.
NN: yes, people often say that human beings are persons, meaning human persons are persons. What’s at issue though is whether all biologically human organisms are persons: this type of issue has been well-known for 50 or so years, going back to the famous article by Mary Anne Warren.
The dictionary, representing common usage, agrees.
Nobis makes the point that we cannot assume that an embryo or fetus is a person. If “person” is defined as being conscious, then we do not assume that. However, Nobis here is subtly shifting our argument that abortion is wrong because it kills a human being, by focusing on definitions of “human beings”, “persons”, and having consciousness or rational thought.
NN: yes, if by “human being,” meaning biologically human organism, but not “person,” the serious question then is, “OK, why would it be wrong to kill this biologically human organism? If the answer is “because it’s a person,” then the question is, “Why it is a person?” If the answer is, because “it is a human being [meaning a biologically human organism—a being that will [meaning, can], under normal circumstances, achieve adulthood and rationality,” then the question is why “person” should be defined that way, instead of other ways.
Nobis objects that we claim that the unborn baby is more than a blob of cells from the beginning. But from the beginning, when they are only one day old, the blueprints of being a human being, and eventually a person, are already there. That we cannot see or observe this is irrelevant.
Granted, since the advent of ultrasounds, few people really believe that unborn babies are merely a blob of cells until birth. Any rational person should agree to that. Some people simply decide not to believe the humanness of unborn babies [???}
NN: no, they don’t think embryos and fetuses are of another species, or that they are not biologically human.
, because they do not want to grapple with the guilt that would ensue, if they are not amoral psychopaths.
NN: or they just don’t believe that abortions are, in general, wrong, potentially for good reasons, and so they do not feel guilty. That’s another hypothesis.
However, we were merely pointing out that some people have stridently argued that the unborn are merely a blob of cells, without making distinctions.
Nobis goes on to state that embryos and fetuses are “human beings,” by which he only means biologically human organisms. Well, they certainly are that. Organisms are individual life forms. The key word here is “life”, i.e., living. The main point is that they are human beings, whatever one’s definition of “persons.” This red herring argument, based on definitions, can be solved by checking out your friendly neighborhood dictionary. A person is defined first as a human being.
NN: it would be worth learning about the fallacy of appealing to common dictionaries for such matters. Are there or could be spiritual, immaterial persons? Many people think yes. Could there be space aliens who a persons? Many people think yes: that’s possible. Could AI ever be a person? That’s what people wonder about. Are any of these “human beings”? Clearly not; and so a person isn’t necessarily a human being, hence the need to think about what makes persons persons.
Nobis then goes on to argue what makes killing wrong. He states that killing is often wrong when (a) the victim wanted to live and (b) killing them decreases, indeed, eliminates their well-being. This is where a fundamental philosophical divide emerges. We hold that killing human beings is objectively wrong.
NN: I didn’t deny that, if you mean what’s often meant by “objective.”
It is wrong to kill innocent people simply because they are human beings with intrinsic value and dignity, and their lives are sacred.
NN: except you probably don’t think that: even you think there are cases where it can be OK to kill, or end the lives of, innocent human beings. And there’s the abstract question of what’s the basis of this intrinsic value and dignity: if one says that humans have it because they are humans, that’s not explanatory.
Nobis may argue that such a view of humanity is dependent upon a religious theistic concept of what people are. Certainly theists do view humans as having dignity and value, but some secular thinkers also have firmly held much the same view.
Nobis’ theory seems to be that killing human beings is wrong merely because it does not maximize utility.
NN: no, nothing like that is said or suggested. Recall what you wrote: “He states that killing is often wrong when (a) the victim wanted to live and (b) killing them decreases, indeed, eliminates their well-being.”
Does Nobis think that if a person is in a moment of despair, perceiving their future is cloudy at best, then there is nothing wrong in killing them?
NN: no, clearly not. Again, recall what you wrote and thoughtfully apply it to the case: “He states that killing is often wrong when (a) the victim wanted to live and (b) killing them decreases, indeed, eliminates their well-being.” Some thoughts: if someone momentarily does not want to live, that doesn’t mean that they have broader, standing, deeper wants to live; if someone believes their life ending would be best for them, that does not mean they are correct.
If he does, then he opens the door to the dehumanization of people and all sorts of ensuing atrocities. Some of these tragic acts, like abortion on demand, are already happening. There is a thin line between euthanasia and mercy killing on the one hand, and the killing of people who are supposedly unworthy of life—such as the handicapped in Nazi Germany, not to mention others considered unworthy of living simply by their ethnicities, such as the Jews. Concerns about this are not absurd.
NN: They are though, even on what you wrote: “He states that killing is often wrong when (a) the victim wanted to live and (b) killing them decreases, indeed, eliminates their well-being.” These victims you mention (a) wanted to lives and (b) their being killed was not for their benefit. So, yes, this comparison is absurd.
One of the problems with euthanasia is that the people may be pressured into accepting being killed, not because they really want to die, but because they are told that it would be better for everyone else—utilitarian.
NN: if someone is told this doesn’t mean it’s true. It’s worth noting though that someone might also withhold treatment in some case, thinking (perhaps mistakenly) that this would be better for all.
Nobis argues that nobody he knows thinks that a 35-year-old is somehow more valuable than a 30-year-old. We don’t either. But there are many people who think that the unborn increase in value with age: that killing a baby at 3 months of gestation is acceptable, while killing a 6-month-old is not. The general idea of this argumentation is that the 6-month-old is more like a newborn baby then. The same may be said about babies immediately after birth. There are few people within our culture who argue in favor of infanticide now, but they may be increasing in number. In much of the ancient world, killing or exposing a baby to the elements was not considered wrong. We seem to be moving backwards in that direction. We remember a time when abortion was considered wrong by most people. In those days, the first advocates averred that they were only in favor of abortion in so-called “hard cases.” Now, we have, in increasing regions, abortion on demand until the moment of birth.
Here we finally come to the main point that Nobis holds to. He writes “Many people think this loss of consciousness would be the loss of a person; they may also think that, until a being is conscious, there is no person. That’s a core idea here that wasn’t effectively engaged.” Based on this reasoning, does Nobis believe that if a person goes into a coma, and is no longer conscious, he is no longer a person, even though we know that at some later time he may regain consciousness?
NN: why not make this more extreme: would anyone think that if you take a nap, and are no longer conscious at that time, you cease to be a person and/or are OK to kill or steal all your stuff? No, of course not. Why not? Apply better answers to a temporary coma case, please.
If Nobis doesn’t hold to this, how does he avoid denying the principle he endorsed above?
NN: Because what was proposed was this: “Many people think this [permanent] loss of consciousness would be the loss of a person; they may also think that, until a being is conscious, there is no person. That’s a core idea here that wasn’t effectively engaged.”
Although he does not specifically say so, he seems to endorse the idea that consciousness is the dividing line. But saying that consciousness is the dividing line has multiple problems. If one takes this bent, that a simple consciousness is what makes a human being a person rather than a blob of cells, then he has a problem with a fetus at a late stage in the pregnancy that shows signs of consciousness and would therefore be considered a person.
NN: below I notice that see our book title. The title suggests that some abortions could be morally wrong. Have you considered that the book argues that later abortions could be wrong?
But he really doesn’t mean this, as we shall show below. . . [Response continues in next comment box.]
We really don’t know for certain when consciousness begins. Scientists think they have some idea, and they may have good reasons and may be right, but unless we have telepathy we cannot know for certain. Some think that the embryo has a soul and may be conscious from the beginning. Even if we take the best guess that we have, it may appear that consciousness occurs several months after conception.
NN: this is not a mere or literal “guess.” There are indicators that people who research these topics are familiar with.
This may or may not be true. However, when we are dealing with the matter of killing a human being, and possibly a person in the sense of having consciousness, we should have a strong reason to pause and ponder. If a person is deer hunting, and sees what looks like it might be a deer, but may well instead be another hunter, the ethical thing to do is not to shoot.
Consciousness, whenever it is achieved, is unquestionably an important milestone in human development. But why is that the dividing line? After all, when the unborn truly first have a glimmering of consciousness, it is probably weak and simple. How far down the animal tree does consciousness exist in animals? This is unknown. Mammals and birds almost certainly have awareness, as do reptiles, and probably fish and amphibians. Octopuses seem to, and maybe other invertebrates. Are any insects or worms conscious? Probably not, though we really don’t know for certain.
If one then argues that a person should not be killed only if they don’t consciously want to live and their life is worth living, then not only is abortion at all stages acceptable, but so is infanticide.
NN: surely you are aware that babies are conscious and feeling, etc. And nothing was said about “consciously want[ing] to live.” This was an idea you brought in.
No one doubts that consciousness is an important aspect of being human and a person, but mere consciousness at any level by itself does not provide the basis of what can be allowed to be killed. As shall be shown, Nobis is really arguing for a particular kind of consciousness.
If in the early stages of pregnancy, the unborn is not conscious, which may well be true, what is happening in almost every case is that the fetus is being prepared to support consciousness. The early stage is hardly irrelevant to the question, as it is the basis for everything that comes later.
In fact, Nobis is being quite disingenuous at this point. We believe that anyone reading his response would think that he makes “having consciousness” the distinction between the unborn of whom it is permissible to abort and those that are not, though he doesn’t specifically say this. In part of the discussion about aborting the unborn, he writes, ”[S]o, such “lines” can and should have buffer zones, so to speak: we can and should be cautious in drawing such lines.” This seems to indicate that we should be cautious about where abortion is permissible. One would believe that he would think that it is permissible to abort the unborn if we have good reason to think that they are not conscious, while wrong to do so afterwards. But one would be wrong.
Nobis is the co-author of a book entitled, Thinking Critically About Abortion: Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong & Why All Abortions Should Be Legal. If this is what Nobis thinks, and since he wrote a book with that title, it almost certainly is, then his statements about consciousness being the dividing line are not his real view. If he thinks that, then the unborn could have a well-developed consciousness and Nobis would hold that it is still permissible to abort them.
NN: so, when it says “Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong,” that suggests that some abortions are or could be wrong. Which would those be? Far later ones.
Indeed, Nobis is apparently one of those people who thinks it’s permissible to abort an unborn baby an hour before birth but to kill it an hour after birth would be murder.
NN: so, when it says “Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong,” that suggests that some abortions are or could be wrong. Which would those be? Far later ones.
When you say “permissible,” why are you switching from morally permissible (which I deny) to legally permissible, without explanation? Also, legal issues are distinct from moral issues: for many reasons, one might think that we are better off to keep “big government” out of emergency medical decisions, which are the only potential cases of what you describe.
Indeed, if what he really believes is that only people whose consciousness is complex enough to want to die and think that there is no hope for a happy life have consciousness enough to be called persons
NN: “only people whose consciousness is complex enough to want to die and think that there is no hope for a happy life have consciousness enough to be called persons.” No, one can be a person and not want to die and have a happy life. What is being said?
, this opens the door to killing far beyond abortion. If he doesn’t believe that, he should have said where exactly the dividing line where a human being is a person is. Based on what he wrote, it seems that killable human beings would also include born babies, young children, and anyone whose intellect of whatever age cannot think about these matters.
NN: again, have you never met a baby or child? You do realize that babies and children are conscious beings, right?
If this is his real belief, why bring up consciousness in the unborn at all? If it is not, then he should show the precise point where the line is drawn, and why he draws it there.
NN: earlier you indicated some awareness of the research and informed thinking about when consciousness begins in human beings. It is after when most abortions occur.
Nobis’ view is a puzzle. He doesn’t believe that being conscious is enough to make a human being a person, because if he did, he would be against abortion at some point of the pregnancy.
NN: so, when it says “Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong,” that suggests that some abortions are or could be wrong. Which would those be? Far later ones
On the other hand, he doesn’t believe that being able to wish that you were dead and foresee a bad future life doesn’t work either, for if it did, he would be in favor of infanticide. So where does he really draw the line and why? He owes us an explanation, if he is going to present contrary views.
Nobis finally makes the following point:
NN: are these always true?
If X has an “inborn capacity” for Y, then it’s wrong to prevent X from becoming Y.
If X has an “inborn capacity” for Y, then someone else is obligated to try to ensure that they become Y.
We doubt that anyone holds that these are always true.
NN: if they aren’t always true, then they do not link the stated claim about embryos having “inborn capacities” to a conclusion that abortion is wrong.
Few would say that it is wrong to kill a weed before it is fully grown. But certainly, it is often wrong to prevent an X from becoming Y. It may not be as wrong to destroy a book manuscript before it is written (if the author doesn’t want it destroyed) as much as when it is finished. But it is still wrong, and even worse if the book cannot then be written. When we are dealing with human beings, the issue is even starker. For to destroy an unborn baby, at whatever stage of gestation, is to interrupt (abort) its growing to become a full human person eventually. To kill the unborn at any stage is to destroy the person that the unborn could become. Every abortion is an act of violence. Further, Nobis misstates the issue when he writes that one is obligated to ensure that some X becomes Y. In the case of the unborn, abortion is not merely just ensuring that the unborn does not become a fully developed person, but it is actually destroying the unborn and any chance that the unborn could have.
Nobis might reply that to see his full argument one should read his book, that he couldn’t say everything that should be said here. We can say the same thing. We wrote a short essay, not a book. If one wants to read a book making the pro-life case, then read Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice, by Francis J. Beckwith.
NN: This is a poorly argued book: here’s a review from long ago: https://philpapers.org/rec/NOBAMA
Nobis also says that one should pay attention to the “best” pro-abortion arguments. However, if our argument is correct, it overrules the objections from the other side, for it would take a very exceptional disputation to override the concept that killing innocent human beings is intrinsically wrong.
NN: yes, the issue though is that (a) that’s not always true and, more importantly, (b) embryos and beginning fetuses are not “innocent human beings,” since that presumes that they are persons and/or moral agents: explanation here: https://www.salon.com/2021/04/11/why-the-case-against-abortion-is-weak-ethically-speaking/